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Right engineering? The redesign of privacy and personal data protection 
The idea of building safeguards for privacy and other fundamental rights and 
freedoms into ICT systems, has recently been introduced in EU legislation as 
‘Data Protection by Design’. This article studies the techno-epistemic network 
emerging around this idea historically and empirically. We present the findings 
of an ‘extended peer consultation’ with representatives of the emerging 
network: policy makers, regulators, entrepreneurs and ICT developers, but 
also with jurists and publics that seem instead to remain outside its scope. 
Standardisation exercises here emerge as crucial hybrid sites where the 
contributions and expectations of different actors are aligned to scale up 
privacy design beyond single technologies and organizations, and to build 
highly interconnected ICT infrastructures. Through the notion of ‘privacy by 
network’, we study how the concept of privacy hereby becomes re-constituted 
as ‘normative transversal’, which both works as a stabilizing promise for 
responsible smart innovation, but simultaneously catalyzes the metamorphosis 
of the notion of privacy as elaborated in legal settings. The article identifies 
tensions and limits within these design-based approaches, which can in turn 
offer opportunities for learning lessons to increase the quality of privacy 
articulations. 
Keywords:  privacy by design; data protection by design; privacy engineering 
 
1. Introduction  
Smart cities powered by smart infrastructures are seen as a major opportunity for 
societies and their economies. They are also a challenge to fundamental rights and 
freedoms such as privacy and personal data protection. Sensing, communicating and 
interacting devices gather and use enormous amounts of information about people’s 
everyday lives. In Europe, the protection of these rights is deemed necessary and is 
specified in the European Convention on Human Rights and in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
At the same time, we see the emergence of a design-oriented approach that aims at 
building safeguards to privacy and personal data protection into ICT. This involves 
concepts such as ‘privacy by design’ (PbD) and ‘data protection by design and by 
default’ (DPbD) introduced into European Legislation by the recently adopted EU 
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General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1; these have also stimulated a nascent 
field of privacy engineering. 
The design-based approach to fundamental rights and freedoms reflects two topical 
trends in EU legislation that are key to the re-articulation of privacy and personal data 
protection. First, it belongs to a broader risk-based turn that brings the regulation of 
personal data processing towards prospective and anticipative management practices 
in organizations. Second, it belongs to an increasing delegation of part of the 
governance of information technologies from the public to the private sector through 
industrial standard setting, certification schemes, codes of conduct and best practices 
(von Schomberg, 2011) as mechanisms to ‘responsibilise’ the actor in control of the 
processing of personal data.2  
Developments around the idea of designing privacy and personal data protection in 
ICT catalyze these trends by gradually moving part of the task of dealing with the 
scope of protection of fundamental rights away from traditional legal settings such as 
courts and civic actors and corresponding procedures, into more private and 
technocratic, upstream processes of technology development.3  
We argue this cannot be understood without also looking at changes in the articulation 
of fundamental rights and freedoms. On the one hand, the hardcoding of legal 
safeguards and principles into technology seems a logical development given the 
ubiquitous proliferation of privacy-threatening and surveillance-based practices and 
technologies4. On the other hand, this evolution may imply changes in the 
connotations of the concepts of ‘personal data protection’ and ‘privacy’ in ways and 
with effects that are hard to predict5. 
In the 1990s, the privacy activist Simon Davies claimed that the character of privacy 
and data protection became ‘re-engineered’. From the 1970s to the 1980s privacy had 
metamorphosed from an issue of societal power relationships to one of strictly defined 
legal rights. In the space of a generation, the concept had shifted from a civil- and 
political-rights issue to a consumer- and rights issue underpinned by the principles of 
data protection (Davies 1998,143).  
                                                          
1 European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (GDPR). 
2 See article 24 GDPR on ‘responsibility of the controller’. 
3 Data protection through extra-legal instruments and processes in addition to law has developed 
gradually in most jurisdictions (see Bennett and Raab 2006). 
4 It seems to follow similar logics as approaches such as value sensitive design (Friedman, 1996). 
5 In ways analogous to those described as mediation of values and technological artefacts by 
sociologists of technology (Latour 1999). 
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In this article, we document parts of the further unfolding of this story, as, from the 
1990s onwards, a second transformational wave takes this idea of ‘re-engineering’ 
quite seriously. Privacy and data protection began to be conceptualised as techno-
organisational measures. As in the first wave, this involves the migration of the 
articulation of these notions towards different sites where they begin to be dealt with 
by different actors. The actors that originally emerged and stabilised around the 
concept of personal data protection can be described as an epistemic community (cf. 
Haas 1992, Bennett and Howlett 1992). This community mobilised a relatively stable 
set of existing principles and knowledge base (mainly originating in law) around a set 
of managerial practices (mainly pertaining to private undertakings). Embraced by 
regulators, it gradually evolved into a proper field encompassing legal scholarship, 
regulators, private actors and institutions, and supported by some segments of civil 
society (Bennett 1992, 2008). In more recent developments, we observe a further 
transition to the constitution of a techno-epistemic network (Rommetveit et al. 
forthcoming 2018; see also Doty & Mulligan 2013).  
Through the notion of ‘privacy by network’, this article elaborates on the predicament 
of this nascent network. It describes some main historical origins and recent 
developments of this network around the idea of building privacy and data protection 
into information technologies, captured in different concepts and approaches 
including ‘Privacy Enhancing Technologies’ (PETs), ‘Privacy by Design’ (PbD), 
‘Data Protection by Design and by Default’ (DPbD) and ‘Privacy Engineering’ (PE) 
This serves as the basis for engaging in an ‘extended peer consultation’ in the context 
of the EU-funded Project CANDID6, with representatives of this emerging techno-
epistemic network such as regulators, entrepreneurs, software engineers, interaction 
designers, as well as with representatives from communities outside its scope like 
civil rights associations, ‘savvy’ users, ethical hackers and jurists. It discusses their 
views on the novelties that these new engineering practices bring to the protection of 
privacy and personal data in contexts of increased interconnectedness such as the 
Internet of Things (IoT)7. By letting the informants’ voices come to the fore, it 
addresses the question of what happens when fundamental rights and principles that 
have traditionally served as guarantees for governing practices and actions related to 
personal information are now mobilised to shape technical specifications for 
                                                          
6 CANDID – Checking Assumptions and promoting responsibility in smart Development – was an EU 
Horizon 2020 project, Grant no—732561. The project aimed to critically appraise smart technologies 
and to explore their prospects. 
7 The IoT is a key priority for the EU Digital Single Market. The European Commission estimates that 
the number of IoT connections within the EU will increase to almost 6 billion in 2020, leading to a 
trillion euro market (Commission Staff Working Document Advancing the Internet of Things in 
Europe, SWD/2016/0110). Privacy by design has been singled out as a key concern for all IoT 
stakeholders, especially ICT product developers (Article 29 Working Party 2014).  
 5 
 
designing information and communication technologies8.  
The double sense of the notion of ‘right engineering’ in the title, captures two related 
aspects of these developments. On the one hand, the article studies different sites, 
actors, and challenges involved in turning legal rights and principles into matters of 
organisational management and into engineering requirements. On the other hand, it 
orients us towards the ‘extension’ of the network towards other actors dealing with 
privacy, which allows for the identification of tensions and limits relating to these 
organisational and design approaches. These, in turn, might offer opportunities for 
learning lessons from other relevant epistemic practices  for increasing the quality of 
privacy articulation within and amongst these practices.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses upon the ‘second 
transformational wave in re-engineering privacy’. It provides a basic description of 
important developments leading to the present configuration of privacy, data 
protection and design, described as the emergence of a techno-epistemic network. 
Section 3 elaborates upon the notion of an extended peer consultation with various  
peer actors situated in and outside of this network. The results are presented in 
sections 4 and 5. Section 4 elaborates on four main ‘privacy articulations’ arising 
within the communities that are tied to the emergence of design-based approaches to 
privacy and personal data protection and the ways in which they are becoming 
networked together. Section 5 adds two privacy articulations obtained by ‘extending’ 
the peer consultation to jurists and publics. The conclusions in section 6 draw things 
together through reflection on the significance of privacy by network and describe 
tensions, limits and lessons of these privacy-design approaches. 
2. Privacy and design, a short history 
  
From the emergence of the Internet in the mid 1990s rapid developments of 
information technologies took place. Governments and businesses struggled to 
encourage public acceptance and adoption of technologies seen as increasingly 
privacy-invasive (Clarke 2009). In Europe and beyond, the main legal source of 
reference for privacy and personal data protection principles was the European Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC, adopted in 1995. The discourse about technological 
solutions for privacy protection was introduced into the data protection regulatory 
                                                          
8 This shift to the articulation of rights in the sociotechnical design of ICTs does not imply that other 
modalities like written text disappear. ‘Just as written law has not replaced the role of unwritten law but 
complemented and changed it, written law as well as unwritten law will continue to play a key role in 
providing legal protection’ (Hildebrandt and Koops 2010, 454). 
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community where the regulation of privacy and data protection was still mostly 
comprehended from a legal perspective. 
Privacy by Design (PbD) has its roots in this period, which, in turn, derives from 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) and Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). PIAs 
emerged in the 1990s in response to increasing public reaction against excessive data 
processing practices, and to manage the risks of damage to reputation of 
organizations. A main argument was that rights infringements identified in the 
assessment could be mitigated through changing the technological design. PETs 
marked a shift from conventional legal regulation to privacy information systems, so 
that ‘when a new information system is being engineered ... the designer can take the 
user’s privacy into account during the different phases of the design process’9. These 
digital technologies centered on protecting people’s identity through anonymization 
and minimizing the use of personal data.10 
The intersection of technology and privacy opened up a ‘new landscape’ (Agre and 
Rotenberg 1998) with important consequences for existing institutional constellations. 
Law started to be perceived as having regulatory limits, captured in the image of a 
‘law lag’: law always lags behind the speed of development of ICT technology (e.g. 
Reidenberg 1998). In several famous publications (Reidenberg 2008; Lessig 1999) 
law and technology were portrayed as alternative regulatory choices in directing the 
behavior of individuals. These writings provided academic and theoretical authority 
and made the model more generic. They sparked heated academic debates on the 
nature of law and technology as regulatory instruments (Brownsword 2005; Gutwirth, 
De Hert and De Sutter 2008; De Vries and van Dijk 2013) and the formulation of 
alternative concepts like ‘techno-regulation’ (Leenes 2011; Koops and Leenes 2014) 
or ‘legal protection by design’ (Hildebrandt 2011). Others saw law and technology as 
part of a broader and complementary array of policy instruments (Raab 1997; Bennett 
and Raab 2006). 
From the start of the new millennium, the ICT sector was increasingly seen as a major 
driver of economic changes at global scale (OECD 2006). Information security and 
privacy gained attention, and globalisation and convergence of business practices 
linked to networked ICT infrastructures led privacy commissioners to demand 
uniform privacy criteria (Cavoukian 2006). There were many efforts to formulate 
privacy standards and principles for the design of IT systems, and privacy 
commissioners were highly vocal through a series of initiatives and resolutions. These 
                                                          
9 Hes and Borking 2000, 41. 
10 These technologies had been developed since the 1980ies by computer scientists and cryptographers, 
most notably David Chaum (1981). 
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included the 2004 Wroclaw Resolution on a Draft ISO Privacy Framework Standard, 
the 2006 Global Privacy Standard, the 2007 Montreal Resolution on Development of 
International Standards for the use of privacy technologies, and The 2009 Madrid 
Privacy Declaration. The latter was signed by some 300 civil society representatives 
and experts concerned about the expansion without ‘independent oversight’ of 
personal data processing by corporations and about ‘unaccountable surveillance’. It 
supported ‘genuine  Privacy Enhancing   Techniques’ w hilst also calling for respect 
of human rights, support for democratic institutions, and full participation of civil 
society in the privacy protection framework. The Montreal Resolution called for ‘the 
involvement of the data protection and privacy community’ in the ‘interpretation of 
legislation in the context of technology standards’. Here law was conceived to have 
regulatory limits vis-à-vis technological developments, but technical settings were 
also considered insufficient to ensure consistent interpretation of, and compliance 
with laws. 
Work initiated by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) working 
group on ‘Identity Management and Privacy Technologies’ led to the adoption in 
2011 of standard ISO/IEC 29100, a general privacy framework for information 
technologies, which enhanced existing security standards by adding a focus on the 
processing of personal data. The standard primarily addressed organisations engaged 
in the processing of personal data but it was also envisaged to aid in the design of 
ICTs. Work on an ISO standard on privacy engineering is currently ongoing (ISO/IEC 
AWI 27550). 
Specific co-regulatory standardisation initiatives for privacy by design have followed  
in Europe. In 2015, the EU Commission issued a mandate for the European 
Standardisation Organisations to develop standards for service providers, but also 
manufacturers11, to execute ‘Privacy by Design’ during the design of security 
technologies.12 Similarly, the European Commission Rolling Plans for ICT 
Standardisation (issued from 2013 to 2017), referred to cross-cutting ways of dealing 
with privacy in technological domains that are key to the Digital Single Market such 
as the IoT, big data, smart grids and smart cities.13 Work was also undertaken to 
create a common EU methodology for privacy and data protection risk assessment for 
RFIDs and smart grids. Two ‘templates’ were established in 2011 and 2013, through 
processes of co-regulation by many stakeholders including the European Commission, 
                                                          
11 European Commission M/530 Implementing Decision C(2015) 102 on a standardisation request to 
the European standardisation organisations as regards European standards and European 
standardisation deliverables for privacy and personal data protection management. 
12 See Kamara 2017 on this case as an example of an increasing co-regulation approach to EU data 
protection. 
13 See for instance, European Commission Rolling Plan for ICT Standardisation 2015, GROW/H3. 
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data protection authorities (DPAs), industry and academia (Beslay and Lacoste 2012; 
Article 29 Working Party 2010).  
Thus the idea of designing privacy protection into ICT systems started circulating in 
various institutions and domains, and gradually became consolidated as an approach, 
complementary or alternative to a ‘deficitary’ legal lag, calling for the vacuum to be 
filled. An international network of privacy and data protection authorities, technology 
developers, businesses, standards development organisations, and privacy advocates 
took shape around this idea, originally the notion of PETs. This was gradually 
accompanied by an endorsement of greater self-regulation for the corporate sector. 
Eventually the broader approach of Privacy by Design (PbD) was developed for 
addressing privacy concerns by going beyond specific technologies, and aiming at the 
overarching organizational level. It focuses on the broader socio-technical dimensions 
of ICT development within organisations and includes business methodologies, 
models, guidelines for management, marketing, customer relations and trust, use 
cases, accountability and legal compliance. The ‘philosophy’ of PbD was further 
consolidated into seven ‘foundational principles’, applicable throughout the whole 
life-cycle of software development and maintenance (Cavoukian 2009).   
Finally, the notion entered legislation through the adoption of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016. Known as Data Protection by Design and by 
Default (DPbD) in article 25, it will be mandatory for organisations (‘data 
controllers’). The DPbD notion seems to have roots in PETs and PbD (i.e. 
pseudonymization, data minimization, etc.).. On the other hand, it is inscribed 
explicitly within the logic and scope of European Data Protection Law and does not 
necessarily cover all aspects of the right to privacy14.    
These developments have further strengthened the move ‘from policy to engineering’ 
(Danezis et al. 2014), since a strong gap is perceived to exist between the regulatory 
discourse on PbD, based on generic techno-organisational principles, and the growing 
field of ‘privacy engineering’ (cf. Spiekermann and Cranor 2009; Cavoukian, Shapiro 
and Cronk 2014; Gürses, Troncoso and Diaz 2015; Finneran Dennedy, Fox and 
Finneran 2014; Notario et al. 2015, Gürses and van Hoboken 2017). Although this 
field existed since the 1990s especially in the context of ubiquitous computing 
systems (Bellotti and Sellen 1993; Langheinrich 2001), it received a boost from 2011 
onwards (Gürses and del Álamo 2016) and quickly emerged as ‘a hot new career’ 
opportunity (Cranor and Sadeh 2013).  
                                                          
14 Enshrined in article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012. 
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Privacy engineering mainly comes from software engineering, a subfield of computer 
science, but extends towards other fields such as information security, human-
computer interaction, and machine learning. Generally, the main aim of the field is to 
turn (abstract) ethical and legal principles into practices and methodologies that can 
be used to hardcode privacy and data protection requirements into ICT. Different 
approaches to privacy engineering can be distinguished. The first, ‘privacy by 
architecture’, builds on the tradition of data minimization and pseudonymization 
pursued in PETs and is very technological in nature. The second, ‘privacy by policy’, 
has a more organisational and legal orientation, focussing on implementing principles 
of notification, specification and choice for data subjects about data processing 
operations (Spiekermann and Cranor 2009), and on the rights of the user as granted by 
data protection law. A third approach, ‘privacy by interaction’, focuses on the 
sociotechnical aspects of design intended to improve users’ agency in different 
contexts (Gürses and del Álamo 2016). This is more social in nature and would 
include contributions by social scientists, ethicists, humanities scholars and the 
participation of data subjects in design processes. In the conclusion we will introduce 
a fourth conception of ‘privacy by network’, which is a specific quality of  socio-
technical networking processes aimed at designing privacy in highly interconnected 
ICT infrastructures.  
2.1.  Remarks on historical developments  
Efforts to deal with the design of privacy and data protection have been undertaken at 
heterogeneous sites and by a plethora of different actors in complex hybrid ecologies 
of practices. This implies that in the association of these concepts with design, the 
general goals may be set by regulators and legislators to protect fundamental rights 
and stimulate markets, but specific means must come from engineering techniques, 
standards and technical specifications that are agreed upon collectively in sectoral and 
international multi-stakeholder fora, including standardisation.  
Hence, the nascent techno-epistemic network of privacy engineering, taking on the 
‘by design’ task, has its main site of operation in technical domains and crucially 
relies upon the contributions of actors from regulation, risk assessment, 
standardisation, certification, etc. As we show in following sections of this paper, this 
is not the only option available for the constitution of the techno-epistemic network. 
The network could for instance also take its mandate directly from privacy-concerned 
publics.  
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3. Extended peer consultation on privacy-design 
A main question related to privacy engineering pertains to the ways in which notions 
of rights are re-negotiated and re-designed as a consequence of these processes. A 
right will acquire new imagined characteristics when dealt with in contexts of risk 
management by organisations having the task to protect data. On the other hand, a 
right acquires material characteristics when hardcoded into ICT systems and 
infrastructures. We enquired about these issues in the  EU CANDID project15 in 
which we explored the ways in which the fundamental rights and freedoms of privacy 
and personal data protection are concretely being evaluated and translated into ICT 
systems. Based on the mapping of the techno-epistemic network of privacy design, we 
conducted an extended peer consultation exercise.16 We contacted a wide range of 
actors engaged within and situated outside the emergent network described in 
Sections 1 and 2. Among the 60 peers consulted, 24 had a role in activities related to 
the assessment and design of privacy and personal data protection in contexts of 
digital technology. We consulted with representatives from the communities that have 
played a role over time in the evolution of the notions of PETs, privacy engineering, 
PbD and DPbD, namely DPAs, universities, standardisers and business experts and 
consultants. The exercise also involved technology developers, engineers, social 
sciences and humanities scholars, specialists in interaction design and value-sensitive 
design. We also involved actors positioned outside this network, extending the 
consultation on these design-based approaches to other peers with relevant experience 
and knowledge in articulating privacy. These included legal scholars and judges in 
European high courts, civil rights organisations representing concerned publics, and 
ethical hackers and technology ‘savvy’ users who themselves participate in 
developing privacy-friendly technological systems.  
We engaged with these peers by means of written questionnaires or interviews 
through which they were presented with issues concerning DPbD and DPIA. We 
wanted to understand from peers what constitutes privacy and personal data 
protection in design. A main result is that different ways of imagining, understanding 
and articulating these notions exist. We found that most peers referred to ‘privacy’ 
rather than to ‘personal data protection’, in line with the historical developments 
within the network of designing ‘privacy’ into ICTs (as captured in the notions of 
                                                          
15 Supra note 6. 
16  We draw inspiration from the notion of ‘extended peer review’ elaborated by Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1993). An extended peer review is the process of including people and groups that have experience 
and knowledge beyond academic science when trying to assure the quality of research, thus increasing 
the reliability of results. Here we apply the concept within a techno-regulatory context, also with the 
aim of extending to other epistemic sources.  
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PET, PbD, PE).17 We thus were able to identify a list of ‘modes’ in which privacy 
becomes articulated as: 
● protection by the data controller  
● an organizational risk  
● an engineering requirement 
● a transversal concern for infrastructure standardisation 
● a human right  
● a public and civic freedom  
 
As we see in Section 4, the first four points pertain to actors that played important 
roles in establishing and perpetuating design-based approaches, positioned at core 
nodes of the privacy-design network. This review shows certain tensions among the 
ways in which privacy becomes articulated. In Section 5, we address the latter two 
privacy articulations in the list and proceed to describe the ‘extension’ of the 
consultation to actors situated outside the network and holding disparate views. This 
will point to new tensions and to the possibility of learning lessons. The presentation 
of each ‘privacy articulation mode’ in Sections 4 and 5 is split into two parts. The first 
lets the peer voices come to the fore, while the second is followed by an elaboration 
that extrapolates the meanings, limits, tensions or lessons discerned. 
4. Articulations of privacy across the design-based network 
4.1.  Protection by the data controller 
A representative of a DPA who is involved in regulatory processes at national and 
European level describes DPbD as a development that ‘could really make a change’ 
as an instrument ‘backed by the force of law’ and associated with the principles of 
transparency and accountability. The peer sees in this a shift from privacy-focused 
technologies towards the design of personal data protection, implying a difference 
between these approaches: 
 
Peer (DPA): we know (…) privacy by design, privacy enhancing 
technologies (...), but now we have a different approach because of the 
GDPR.  It’s not totally different.  But we have to make sure that now the 
main focus it’s about data protection...The GDPR, assumes that there is a 
data controller. 
                                                          
17 From this perspective personal data protection, as captured in the notion of DPbD, becomes another 
such articulation on top of these earlier privacy design developments, in spite of the fact that privacy 
and data protection are often considered distinct in legal practice. 
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The notion of personal data protection by design predominantly centers on the role of 
the controller as the responsible entity for the protection of individuals. This is not 
necessarily the case, for other type of protection systems such as PETs that can also 
be directly deployed by users themselves. Because of this, according to the peer, the 
GDPR is not ‘technology neutral’.  
 
She is in favour of a regulatory framework that puts the burden of personal data 
protection on organisations as ‘powerful players’ rather than ‘on the shoulders of the 
citizens’. This is related to the complexity inherent in current algorithmic data 
processing practices:  
 
Peer (DPA): the idea is that it’s possible to understand what is happening 
otherwise you cannot decide, and this is a big challenge. (...) If there are 
algorithms working on databases that are collecting data all the time then 
it’s simply too complex. (...) there’s so many automatic decisions where 
I’m not even aware that this decision had been done.  
 
The peer argues that this points to the limits of the right to informational self-
determination according to which subjects need to have the capacity to make 
autonomous decisions about data processing. She also explains that the current 
emphasis on the data-controlling organisation in data protection legislation may not 
be sufficient as it mostly overlooks the important role of manufacturers and system 
developers. These are the actors that actually integrate data protection safeguards into 
technology but GDPR merely ‘encourages’ them to practice DPbD in product 
development18. For this reason she believes that GDPR ‘has a flaw’ and would like to 
see manufacturers addressed in a direct way. She maintains that the Regulation should 
be interpreted in a way that also allows individuals to make use of ‘self-defence’ 
technologies as this would reinforce the array of protective instruments.  
 
The possibility for individuals to make use of such technologies is also an important 
point of attention for other peers. The most emblematic example comes from 
representatives from the Quantified Self, an international movement of ICT 
prosumers that has recently developed plans for realising a user-centric personal data 
management system. The system places the user at the point of integration for 
                                                          
18 Recital 78 of the GDPR states that ‘producers of the products, services and applications should be 
encouraged to take into account the right to data protection when developing and designing such 
products, services and applications [emphasis added].’ Bygrave (2017) remarks that ‘the Regulation 
evinces an expectation that the duty imposed by Article 25 on controllers will be passed both 
‘downstream’ to processors and ‘upstream’ to technology developers.’ (p. 116). 
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different data-streams. Individuals thus act themselves as data controllers. At the core 
of the approach is a specific understanding of privacy:  
 
Peer (ICT prosumers movement): Privacy (...) has to be created with 
autonomy because it’s about you shaping your own identity vis-à-vis the 
external world. If you have no privacy, how can you have identity?  
 
Such a definition of privacy as essential for autonomous identity formation, resonates 
with the ability to take autonomous decisions within the right to informational self-
determination. The peer however argues that promoters of user-centric systems of the 
kind described face the difficulty of finding a business model that could sustain them, 
including venture capital and investors. Due to such a ‘practical imperative’, the 
original idea usually ‘moves towards something completely different to what had 
been imagined’. 
 
4.1.1. Data Protection by Design: refocusing from individuals to controlling organizations   
The introduction of the notion of DPbD in the GDPR fortifies a trend within the larger 
techno-epistemic network of privacy design.  Strong emphasis is put on data 
controlling organizations for ensuring DPbD, but they must rely on solutions 
developed by technology producers who, in turn, are only ‘encouraged’ to take 
personal data protection into account.  
 
In such a context, it is unclear whether alternative design systems for individuals to 
act autonomously towards data protection remain available. Complexification of data 
analysis and automated decision-making is an important justification for a regulatory 
framework solidly based on the role of a data-controller organisation. This 
corresponds to a departure from solutions focused on the individual and his or her 
capacity to control data and make autonomous decisions, as is for instance recognised 
in the understanding of privacy as informational self-determination19. Instead these 
solutions are increasingly focused on the protection of personal data by an 
organisation, under the header of DPbD. This regulatory trend finds a concrete 
matching in the financial difficulties encountered by promoters of alternative user-
centric systems.  
 
                                                          
19 This right was first recognised by the German Constitutional Court in 1983 (BVerfGE 65, 1).  It can 
be  understood  in  association  with  the  free  development  of  personality  according  to  which  
subjects  need  to  have  the  capacity  to  decide  autonomously (See Gonzalez Fuster 2014).  
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4.2. An organisational risk  
Many peers depict a situation in which organisations still find it difficult to act as data 
controllers. In particular, a reputed public and private sector consultant, with long-
standing experience in data protection regulation, explains that they ‘have to realise 
that there is a risk’, otherwise they ‘will not do anything’:  
 
Peer (Consultancy DPIA and DPbD):  to understand this, organisations 
have to analyse in depth their data flows and most organisations haven’t 
done that (...) and actually do not know what kind of processing is taking 
place. 
 
She proposes a definition whereby the possible damage to a fundamental right is 
compared to the damage to assets of the organisation: 
  
Risk is a probability that, due to a particular threat, a particular 
vulnerability exploits it and causes a damage to an asset. In this case, it 
would be damage to the fulfilment of a human right. 
 
She sees evaluation of risks in contexts of DPIAs as the pre-requisite for adequate 
deployment of DPbD but explains that although the GDPR makes it compulsory, it 
may take time before it will be accepted as ‘something you have to do’. DPbD is 
‘low’ in the general administration and industry agenda, ‘it takes time and money’ and 
data are of high value.  
 
The peer believes the situation may change if DPbD is accompanied by development 
of a DPIA according to specific templates that should be developed within multi-
stakeholder fora. She mentions the example of the (D)PIA methods for RFIDs and 
smart metering systems developed by market, policy actors and ‘people that 
understand those processes’ endorsed by the European Commission (see section 2). 
The peer also believes the development of standardised ‘building blocks’ for PbD 
could meet organizations’ needs, helping them to overcome the difficulty of 
customized solutions.  
 
Another peer from a data-controller organisation expresses the need to conduct 
discussions over privacy and security as risks at ‘chain level’. She explains that all 
chain actors are currently trying to assess their own risks:   
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Peer (energy distribution utility): organisations should think broader than 
their own responsibility and create a common mind-set of which risks 
there are in a chain. And that is very difficult if you have multiple 
stakeholders in the chain.  
 
In her view, organisations should thus develop joint strategies to face common 
challenges beyond their own responsibility.  
 
4.2.1. Towards standardised risk assessment methodologies for DPbD 
The association of personal data protection with the ‘risk to an asset’ corresponds to a 
conception of ‘rights as risks’ for an organization that have to be managed (Murphy 
and Whitty 2009; van Dijk, Gellert and Rommetveit 2016). On this conception, 
human rights become economic resources that can be controlled through risk 
management and design in order to produce value, or in this case, used to prevent 
damage to the company. 
 
Networked efforts to develop methodological risk assessment templates for (D)PIAs  
(as for RFIDs and smart grids) and the development of design methods based on 
standardised building blocks are believed to be more effective than customized 
solutions. These standardised solutions are developed by expert professionals 
(regulators, risk assessors, sector stakeholders, etc.) who mobilise their different 
(disciplinary) knowledge bases. The underlying rationale is that many actors and 
fields become aligned with standardised risk assessment methodologies in support of 
specific design frameworks. This mirrors the point on chain evaluation of risks, raised 
by the peer from the energy infrastructure field. The standardised templates and 
building blocks function as stabilising promise for all actors in the chain and as 
solutions to many concerns such as ensuring action towards rights’ protection for 
regulators, addressing regulatory uncertainties for organisations, etc.  
4.3. An engineering requirement 
We have engaged with representatives from the privacy engineering community,  
working in departments of applied research of technical universities, ICT engineering 
experts cooperating closely with DPAs, and consultants for the regulatory and the 
private sectors. There is a level of indeterminacy with regard to the concept of 
privacy. For instance, some peers report problems understanding what exactly should 
be protected. They refer to privacy as insufficiently rigorous to translate into a ‘formal 
definition’: 
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Peer (engineering - user interaction design): privacy is too vague and is 
difficult to align with the concrete character of engineering requirements 
and things engineering needs to consider.  
 
She moreover points to a disjunction between the reasoning styles of engineering and 
law. Most of the time, ‘legalese’ is not enough to ‘bake’ protection in an algorithm or 
system.  
  
Peer (engineering - user interaction design): There is a difference between 
the moral reasoning linked to human rights and the attempt of solving an 
engineering problem, which is technically and mathematically specified.  
 
There is considerable difficulty in translating legal principles into ‘engineering 
requirements’. Such  abstract values often ‘do not acknowledge the level of specificity 
required by engineering’ where many decisions have to be made all the time that ‘pass 
under the radar’ but ‘we still have to stick a ‘privacy label’ to them’. Another peer 
from privacy engineering mentions that some exercises end up focusing on design 
solutions that are based on ‘somewhat arbitrary goals’ that can be ‘easily defined’ in 
mathematics. This is problematic to the extent that design goals are meant to articulate 
the problem that the technology tries to solve.  
 
Other peers are more optimistic and refer to methodologies that can contribute 
because they try to ‘minimise the data that is kept for a long time in machine learning 
applications by means of selective data systems’; ‘seek to integrate fairness in 
machine learning predictions’; ‘identify and develop privacy requirements that are 
built based on interdisciplinary insights’; or ‘try to make the bridge between technical 
system building and social findings’. At the same time, most peers agree that what 
works in one context may be unsuitable in another and some ready-made solutions 
could have unforeseen side effects. The combination of two best available 
technologies with good privacy features may for instance cause the loss of protection, 
due to increased data linkability and loss of anonymisation guarantees. 
  
One  peer argues that impact assessment for privacy and personal data protection can 
provide important orientations for design, since their outcome ‘gives you chances of 
understanding the design space’ and thus to come up with better PbD choices  
‘because you understood better the data you are collecting, the reason for collecting it, 
the impact that the data might have, the weaknesses that you may encounter, the 
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vulnerabilities and so forth’. At the same time, she acknowledges the lack of 
determined instructions:  
 
Peer (engineering - ubiquitous computing): you could argue that Privacy 
Impact Assessments are part of Privacy by Design Processes, but I really 
think there isn’t a fixed recipe for Privacy by Design unfortunately. I think 
there are few books now out there but there isn’t really a ‘look-at book’ to 
tell people what to do and how to do it.  
 
4.3.1. Legal principles and engineering requirements: in search of mediators 
It is possible to identify recurring traits in the privacy engineering exercises described. 
A first noteworthy finding is that most peers do not clearly differentiate between the 
concepts of privacy (PbD) and data protection (DPbD) in discussing programming 
frameworks, a distinction that is for instance firmly enshrined in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.20 At the same time, privacy clearly emerges as a real 
engineering challenge when it has to acquire material characteristics of ICT. Peers 
report a significant degree of uncertainty about how to translate such a polysemic 
concept into technical and mathematical language. Whereas the translation of legally 
significant principles into technical specifications is important as it determines how 
rights are protected, major difficulties emerge because of differing reasoning styles in 
human rights and engineering disciplines. This difference is worth exploring. Our 
peers explain that it takes substantial research to achieve a good outcome. The way 
rights become de facto implemented ultimately depends on discretionary decisions 
about code, hardware and software, requirements as well as technical and 
mathematically specified language.  
 
Such processes are not very flexible. They are tailored to the specificities and 
constraints of engineering practice (a particular ‘goal’ or algorithm) and a small 
change can require a lot of work. The scope of interpretation for good outcomes in 
terms of rights protection is framed within relatively fixed boundaries, even when 
including the guidance that could be found in DPIA. There is a considerable 
difference with the types of hermeneutic at stake in legal approaches. These instead 
consist in complex articulations within a case between polysemic legal principles, 
disputed facts, resonance with other cases, authorization by sources and procedural 
                                                          
20 The Charter recognises privacy and personal data protection as two distinct fundamental rights in 
articles 7 and 8. The right to privacy protects the individual by warranting a certain level of opacity to 
the citizen (Gutwirth and De Hert 2007). Opacity guarantees non-interference in individual matters by 
the state and, more recently, by private actors. The right to personal data protection instead imposes a 
certain level of ‘transparency’ and accountability on the exercise of power.  
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conditions, whereby certain contents are qualified, formalised and ‘jurimor-phed’ 
(Gutwirth 2015), (van Dijk 2015).  
4.4. A transversal concern for infrastructure standardisation  
Some peers explain that today’s increasing big data processing and growing 
interdependencies in the Internet of Things imply an adaptation of current approaches 
to privacy design, in close association with security practices. This is because in 
situations of increased interconnectedness privacy and security risks can escalate and 
become systemic. Privacy in the IoT thus not only concerns single devices but also 
the communication links with other points in this ecosystem. Several peers explain 
that there is a need to go beyond the organisation as the unit for achieving privacy 
protection in order to shift focus from single ICT technologies to highly 
interconnected ICT infrastructures.  
 
Novel technical aspects thus emerge through the need to establish interoperability and 
standards. This is not an easy task because the degree of consistency between sub-
systems required by an IoT ecosystem is high and ‘99% focus of technical people is 
about solving this as the ‘sine qua non condition for the market to happen’. A peer 
explains that many efforts within standardisation bodies are currently aimed at 
‘integrating things and applications so that we have something consistent’. This has 
implications for the way privacy safeguards are conceived and become articulated. 
  
Peer (consultancy DPbD): When we want to take into account privacy and 
other concerns, we have to take them into account as transversal concerns 
(...) security, privacy, safety, energy consumption or taking into account 
ethical aspects and things like that. (…) we need to be able to engineer 
transversal concerns and ‘capabilities’ in things. 
  
The peer argues that building these systems is a very complex exercise. 
Standardisation efforts are often aimed at integrating privacy concerns as horizontal 
capabilities for IoT products and systems in such a way that interoperability is 
granted. Privacy here enters as a ‘transversal concern’ that needs to traverse, connect 
and align different social and technical aspects of these complex systems. First, there 
is the complexity of the technical aspects, since the IoT depends on interoperability 
among (at least) three levels: applications from service providers, things with certain 
capabilities enabling service provision, and semantic points of interconnection 
between the other elements. Privacy thus has to be designed into each level to allow 
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interaction among them, by being translated into a ‘service description’ and 
standardised through semantic interoperability specifications. 
 
Secondly, complexity is related to the fact  that in the IoT many different applications 
and things that are often built by different companies, will have to communicate with 
each other, but frequently lack coordination. In this respect, the peer sees a need of a 
‘chain perspective’ in developing the IoT: 'we know “from the start” that there is an 
issue of not having IoT devices built with the involvement of stakeholders'; including 
end-users.‘Co-creation’ is proposed as a solution, involving customers and application 
providers in the design of IoT, including privacy concerns. The concept of privacy is 
here operationalised according to an  approach from customer relations management 
and applied to the technical semantics of IoT architecture presented above.21 This 
privacy terminology feeds into the standardisation exercises to achieve the required 
coordination between the different actors involved. 
 
The peer explains that the technical complexity of this IoT architecture is often not 
grasped, whereas it determines the bulk of the work by technical people. This 
complexity reduces the scope of co-creation, since it can limit the feasibility of 
solutions sometimes deemed desirable by users or social scientists (e.g., those 
formulated in use cases). In this sense, the peer states that: 
  
Peer (consultancy DPbD): You can only suggest to user things you are 
sure you can implement otherwise you break the trust link between the 
user and the designer. 
 
and 
 
Peer (consultancy DPbD): The gap is just too big between the user and the 
engineer that knows the capability of the robot (…) it is really about 
building a language for co-creation (…) This vocabulary must be mapped 
with technical capabilities that the engineer has in mind. (...) We look at 
privacy and user. We should be able to explain the user the capability of 
the technology and then we are sure that he understands. 
 
The engineers have thus to take the lead and start by mapping and describing the 
technical capabilities of the product and service. Users only come in after technical 
                                                          
21 Co-creation is an approach for the joint creation of value by the company and the customer. Its 
principles are: dialogue with users, access to data, risk assessment and transparency of information 
(Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004).  
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capabilities have been transformed into a ‘user taxonomy’ that is sufficiently 
intelligible to test the user's ‘trust’. Social scientists can also be involved if they can 
help to ascertain the acceptable level of trust for users; the peer considers  that ‘trust is 
about psychology’.  
 
A similar perspective is taken when the peer comments upon advantages of IoT 
technologies for smart cities. She refers to initiatives within the European Innovation 
Partnership on Smart Cities and Communities (EIP-SCC)22 where a 'Citizen Centric 
Approach to Data-Privacy by Design' is taken. She explains PbD processes should be 
done by ‘independent’ people who ‘understand how privacy is built, people that 
citizens trust’, for assurance that ‘a product is done properly’, while citizens’ 
associations could verify the process.   
 
4.4.1. Assuming compliance in complex network inclusions  
We learn that in current contexts of increased interconnectedness, it is highly probable 
to inherit or contribute to a systemic escalation of risks, thus raising issues of code 
reliability and shared responsibility for market actors in ICT ecosystems. We have 
described efforts to neutralise risks not uniquely at the level of single technologies but 
from an infrastructural perspective, and how standardisation facilitates these attempts. 
By reconciling the views of market actors on how to foster integration of components 
for the IoT, standardisation also supports their collective decisions about distributed 
responsibilities.  
 
There is generalised confidence that once standards are established, they can support 
conformity of IoT products to legal requirements. Standards per se are however not a 
guarantee of legal compliance23. Their conformity to law is presumed. Yet 
standardisation has acquired an increasingly important role in public policies to spur 
technological innovation24. This leaves a number of important legal issues open in the 
recent European approach, such as how far delegation of public rule-making to 
standardisation bodies may go and who is responsible for the content of the standards. 
                                                          
22 EIP-SCC is a PPP supported by the European Commission bringing together cities, industries, 
SMEs, investors, researchers and other smart city actors. http://eu-
smartcities.eu/initiatives/2/description 
23Standards imply a process through which organisational claims about adherence to norms can be 
more objectively tested (Bennett and Raab, 2006). 
24 Standards ‘play a very important role within the internal market (...) in the presumption of 
conformity of products to be made available on the market with the essential requirements (...) laid 
down in the relevant Union harmonisation legislation’. Recital 5 of European Parliament and Council 
Regulation 1025/2012 on European standardisation.   
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Other tensions with law come to the fore in the way that courts are striking down 
certain standards through judicial review (van Gestel and Micklitz 2013).  
 
Some have even argued that ‘techno-policy’ standards for privacy design of digital 
technologies (e.g., the internet) constitute new modes of governance beyond 
traditional state governance, but also beyond self-governance, towards co-governance 
in multi-stakeholder fora where certain actors become interdependent and regularly 
interact (Doty and Mulligan 2013).  
 
In the case of co-creation, privacy becomes  articulated into different (infra)structural 
levels in the form of the technical specifications needed for the IoT to function. The 
concept also becomes co-articulated and associated with other transversal concerns, 
especially security, safety but also trust and interoperability. Adequacy of privacy 
protection is associated with degrees of consumer trust, but what this means remains 
underdetermined. The connotation of privacy and protection of personal data as 
fundamental rights does not seem to play a determining role in the legitimation of the 
system described. The criteria for the interplay between privacy protections vis-à-vis 
standardisation concerns and for decisions on potential trade-offs between them are 
not clear. Apart from being tied to technical constraints – i.e., capabilities, semantics, 
specifications – such decisions are generally oriented by the technology development 
culture embraced by manufacturers, developers, innovators. These types of interplay 
deserve more attention in light of the central role of privacy for societal power 
relationships and its transformational waves described in Section 1.  
 
Lastly, other interesting transformations can be observed with privacy assuming a 
‘transversal’ role. The European Commission explains that work on the basic 
infrastructure for ICT systems is of horizontal relevance25. In such a perspective, 
privacy standards apply to very different policy areas and sectors, and must also serve 
various purposes by dealing with both protection of personal data (including, where 
needed, through PbD) and the free movement of such data in order to foster progress 
in key technologies that are critical to the completion of the Digital Single Market and 
to innovation initiatives, such as the one on smart cities and communities (EIP-SCC). 
The citizen-centric dimension of the latter addresses the need for all supply-chain 
actors involved in making smart cities to coordinate efforts. This serves to meet the 
demand for compliance checks and privacy standards from policy-makers and to 
                                                          
25 In this view, work on the basic infrastructure for ICT systems is of horizontal relevance and 
‘standards should be considered as building blocks. Metaphorically, one could see these technologies 
such as Lego pieces that can be utilised to build complex architectures.’ (EC Rolling Plan  2015, p. 5, 
supra note 13). Privacy aspects are a prime example.  
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scale-up privacy solutions by establishing guidelines for PIAs, PbD, and ‘chain 
oriented’ standards26. Nevertheless, whereas users or citizens are frequently placed 
up-front as prime beneficiaries of ICT developments, their views cannot be fully 
included due to systemic and technical complexity, intrinsic to the development of an 
interoperable, smart ICT infrastructure. Where the techno-epistemic network is 
stabilising, other main important aspects of privacy, i.e. law and civic concerns, are 
more bottom-up and local in nature, and may struggle to keep up with the direction of 
these activities, as we describe in the next Section. 
5. Extensions towards legal practices and publics 
 
Privacy by design is a technical approach to a social problem. Obviously 
technology cannot help with all related aspects. Especially in the field of 
privacy, which touches various basic rights topics, such as freedom of 
expression and press, or protection from discrimination, issues have to be 
tackled in a grander scheme by society as a whole. (Danezis et al. 2014, 
48) 
 
In the historical overview (Section 2) we have already noted important points of 
divergence within the processes that led to the formulation, stabilisation and 
proliferation of design-based approaches to privacy. These coincide with the two 
historical transitions through which the concept of privacy has become ‘re-
engineered’: from a civil-political right dealing with societal power relations, to a 
more narrowly-defined right to data protection and consumer issue, and recently to a 
matter of socio-technological design of ICTs.  
In this section we link back to those two points of divergence by consulting with 
disciplines and practices currently situated outside the techno-epistemic network and 
which also hold experience and knowledge with regard to privacy in ICT 
technologies. This is why the notion of ‘extension’ is at the heart of the ‘peer 
consultations approach’ described in Section 3. It allows the inclusion of other actors 
who have contributed and still contribute to making privacy a public concern and a 
legal right. These outside views may provide further clarity about the limits of the 
network, of possible tensions in its making, and of disciplinary constraints that should 
not be transgressed.  
                                                          
26 Especially ISO 27550 standard on Privacy Engineering (see Section 2). 
 23 
 
5.1.  A human right  
In section 4.3 we have learnt that a significant gap exists between practices of law and 
design that makes it difficult to turn legal principles into engineering requirements. 
We entered into dialogue with jurists with privacy and data protection experience to 
learn more about the nature of this gap, now seen from the legal side of the equation. 
A judge from the Court of Justice of the European Union explains that ‘obviously’ 
jurists understand that engineers and other technical experts ‘do not think  about 
human rights when they work’, this being the reason why ‘the law’ must play  a role 
‘which is of course posterior’ to that of design, and that ‘technical experts should be 
aware of the limits of their activities’. Legislation gives ‘orientations’ for data-
collection activities to be respectful of fundamental rights and freedoms, but it cannot 
foresee all possible situations: 
 
as the case-law shows, situations are so different (...) even if you provide 
for detailed rules in law, in certain cases they will not be applicable or 
their application would create  a  bad  result  (...)  this  is  the  task  of  
law,  of  doctrine,  of  case  law  to  find  in  a  concrete  case  a  justified  
solution.   
 
In this perspective, decisions on rights safeguards, taken in contexts of technology 
design, are not constitutive of law. Law intervenes ex-post to articulate and ascertain 
whether the scope of protection of a fundamental right has been correctly formulated. 
The judge explains that interpretation is not an easy task:  
 
we know the cases when the producers do not understand the legislation, 
do  not understand a judgement. This self-restriction is a difficult task and 
they can never be sure that their way of limiting themselves would be 
appreciated  correctly in a future court case.  
 
Similar limitations were pointed out by a human rights lawyer27. From the perspective 
of human rights, impact assessment practices could trap rights inside a regulatory and 
legalistic cage.28 Assessment based on organisational techniques relocates the seat  of 
                                                          
27 This contribution was made in a peer public session focused specifically on DPIA. See van Dijk and 
Rommetveit 2015. 
28 The peer states that contributions from ethics and social science may not be able to counter this 
tendency but could rather enhance them. Such shifts could imply epistemic divisions concerning who is 
articulating what within these processes. She argues that this poses the risk that human rights such as 
privacy are separated in two components, in which the articulation of privacy as a value is delegated to 
ethics and social (ELSA) studies and the articulation of privacy as a right to jurists. This externalizes 
values from human rights.  
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articulation of fundamental rights such as privacy to risk managers and privacy  
impact  assessors, away from traditional actors and institutions such as courts, but also 
in wider society from citizens and human rights activists. This peer remarks that if 
such assessments are to be made, they should be anchored in the discourse of human 
rights rather than in risk management.  
 
She also argues that an exclusive focus on privacy and personal data protection in 
these design practices implies a narrowing of the subject. Other human rights such as 
dignity, non-discrimination and equality also have to be considered by engineering 
disciplines. A peer from the field of technology regulation formulates a similar 
argument but sees such broadening of design focus as a complex task.  She argues that 
if the notion of DPbD is ‘confined’ to data protection, then it is possible to provide 
transparency regarding compliance with the GDPR (with respect to the purposes of 
data processing, for instance). However, ‘if DPbD is supposed to cover rights (beyond 
data protection) things are much more complicated’. The peer believes that jurists 
should participate in impact assessment to evaluate GDPR requirements and other 
possible legal consequences of data processing. 
  
Along these lines, the human rights lawyer believes impact assessment and design 
processes should grow from human rights commitments and identify attributes of 
these rights from case law. She specifies that lessons can be learnt from international 
human rights law and international binding treaties and from attempts to incorporate 
human rights into commercial practices, as in human rights impact assessments.29 She 
expands on this more co-constructive approach to risk and design by proposing a few 
suggestions:   
 
Peer (Human Rights Field): There might be a rights-based alternative like 
sustainable development for better ICTs, or the notion of ‘good science’ 
formulated by Charis Thompson. Perhaps the notion of good engineering 
could be helpful here? There needs to be a conversation between risk, 
design and engineering people, but herein some legal guarantees may be 
lost and this must be acknowledged. 
 
The peer refers to the notion of ‘good science’, relating to a co-production of science 
with ethics in innovation.30 Instead of just following after, or impeding research and 
                                                          
29 See Harrison 2013. 
30 Thompson 2013.  This both goes beyond the ideas of ethics having to ‘clean up’ after science (ethics 
lag), or of merely describing the ethical, legal, and social implications of scientific research and 
development (ELSA studies).  
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development, it has a pro-active role in intervening in science-in-the-making and is 
thus co-constitutive within this process.31 In the context of engineering rights, it 
implies a co-production between design, risk and right-based actors including 
engineers, lawyers, risk managers and publics, which might imply mutual 
transformations in the contributions of each. In direct response, a social scientist peer 
working in the context of IoT design argues that good engineering implies the need to 
develop local infrastructures and is associated with contextual technology. 
 
 
5.1.1. Towards good engineering: lessons from law  
The discourses on ‘privacy by design’ and especially ‘code as law’ have evoked the 
promise of bridging the gap between law and technology both in practice and in 
theory. As such they have often functioned as useful conditions for different actors to 
cluster together, but also to draw legitimacy from and through law. We have however 
already seen that in practice this exercise is riddled with difficulties of mutual 
incompatibility.  Hence, we see that various peers from the legal field also reinstate a 
firm divide: legal practice needs to maintain a critical distance to check technical 
articulations of rights, based on its own quality procedures, resources and concepts. 
Perhaps it reminds us of the obvious: that what the privacy engineers do is not itself 
something juridic, but the obvious might have become blurred by such analogies, and 
may become further blurred as these practices expand and become powerful norm-
setters. Certain principles that have become enshrined in the law over time (and 
existed earlier as political freedoms or social values) are now articulated according to 
the concepts, tools and methods of the practices of engineering and risk management, 
moving these notions away from the idea of rights articulated in courts with all the 
longstanding procedural guarantees and checks of epistemic quality (due process).32 
This points to a need for a firmer embedding of design-based approaches to rights 
within extended ecologies of practice. Further principles and procedures might be 
needed for proper checks and balances to be exercised: between different epistemic 
and normative commitments, between disciplines, and as provided for by robust legal 
and public guarantees.33 
 
                                                          
31 Similar arguments have been made about the co-productive role of law in techno-scientific 
innovation, criticizing the image of a ‘law lag’ and arguing for the constitutive role of law within 
scientific work itself; see Jasanoff 2007. 
32 On the crucial difference between law and technology in this context of techno-regulation, see 
(Brownsword 2005; Gutwirth, de Hert and de Sutter 2008; De Vries and van Dijk 2013). 
33 It has been noted that design-based approaches to fundamental rights and freedoms raise concerns 
about lack of democratic legitimization and the unambiguous self-enforcing character of ‘code as law’ 
leaving no room for deliberation (Hildebrandt and Koops 2007, 2010).  
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Design practices also provide opportunities for a co-productive role of law within 
techno-scientific innovation processes. This can be captured by the notion of ‘right 
engineering’, which implies the learning of important lessons from legally relevant 
fields. These lessons can be derived from case law, pertaining to the crucial concepts 
to be assessed in PIA or DPIA such as risk, probability and harm, but also pertaining 
to the quality of the articulation processes themselves (van Dijk, Gellert and 
Rommetveit 2016).34 Other lessons might be learnt from legal approaches to fields 
like human rights impact assessment or environmental impact assessment, thus 
broadening the scope of privacy in relation to other human rights such as data 
protection, discrimination and dignity on the one hand, and to sustainable technology 
development on the other. 
5.2. A public and civic freedom  
As seen in Section 2, civil society actors have engaged in the historical developments 
related to PETs, supporting their implementation. They also reclaimed participation in 
frameworks for privacy protection, reaffirming a decisive role for democratic 
institutions and human rights against threats of ‘unaccountable’ surveillance. In our 
peer consultation we contacted representatives of civil rights organisations and 
inquired about recent developments in the privacy-design field. One peer is, in 
principle, also positive towards privacy-design processes if implemented in ‘honest’ 
ways. At the same time, she strongly argues the need to look at the whole regulatory, 
economic and political situation, because the current focus on the GDPR could detract 
attention from the expanding role of surveillance practices and technologies in a 
number of areas. Thus the peer asserts that one ‘should not just focus on the GDPR 
and should also address other laws that restrict freedoms’.  
 
The peer also sees problems in the growing reliance on PIA and PbD with the 
argument of increased ‘efficiency’, often also raised in support of  privatising public 
services. She remarks that in the Netherlands, the emergence of public-private 
partnerships holding tasks related to services of general interest (for instance in the 
health and insurance sector) that process vast amounts of personal data, marks a 
worrying trend of a fast-emerging surveillance economy. The protection of 
fundamental rights may here be regarded as ‘an “obstacle”’  to be overcome as soon 
as a new opportunity for the economy arises. She believes that the use of DPIA and 
DPbD can here play an instrumental role, in serving as ‘an excuse for innovation’ and, 
when deployed by companies, to further the ‘privatisation’ of fundamental rights and 
                                                          
34 See also De Hert 2012. 
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freedoms. These tools can also serve for avoiding ‘hopes and concerns’ being raised 
from public opposition, thus deflecting and discarding them:  
 
Peer (civil rights organisation): ‘We do a PIA so it is okay’. It is used as a 
palliative to make it impossible for people opposing, to raise issues that 
certain developments infringe fundamental rights. (...) Our living base is 
regarded as a market commodity and not as a fundamental freedom. It is 
changed into a risk dimension: stealing the rights of citizens in change for 
risk management. 
 
A lack of checks on these processes, and on their focus, also worries her: 
 
Peer (civil rights organisation): no one opposes them and no one checks 
the quality of the process. Politicians have no notice of the contents. A 
PIA should start with honesty. The focus should not be on mere 
compliance. 
 
In her view, governments should force companies to provide adequate information on 
these processes and laments that in fields such as the IoT or smart energy meters the 
current level of general information released to users is ‘very poor and simplified’.   
 
5.2.1. Towards ‘honest’ design: avoiding blue-washing and public palliatives 
In the account just presented, DPIA and DPbD, introduced as compliance instruments 
to personal data protection legislation need to be situated within a larger constellation 
of actors and broader articulations of privacy and personal data protection as civil and 
political rights and freedoms and as important social values. Salient arguments and 
sources of justification for their centrality in western democratic societies come from 
the 1960s and 70s civil rights movements (cf. Bennett 2008; Davies 1998; Clarke 
2009, etc.). These rights have also been forcefully articulated by ‘privacy advocates’ 
(Bennett 2008), i.e., privacy- and fundamental rights lawyers and activists, as 
demands based on the general interest, to be upheld and protected by governments.  
 
Here important limits and tensions can be discerned about what the practices currently 
involved in the operationalisation of DPIA and PbD can do, especially in a broader 
regulatory context in which part of the competence of dealing with privacy and other 
fundamental rights and freedoms is delegated to companies acting independently or 
within public-private partnerships. This is strongly formulated in the notion of DPIA 
as ‘a public palliative’ when these practices thwart public mobilisation around privacy 
issues. Several such public protests have proved to be quite effective in influencing 
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future technology designs. In this sense they also mediate between the dissatisfaction 
of end users and expert decision-makers. The obstruction of mobilisation raises 
questions about the justification for introducing these tools, bearing in mind that 
addressing these publicly voiced concerns was a historical driving force behind 
developing PIA (Clarke 2009). 
 
An important question is whether these tools could further the protection of privacy, 
or whether they could actually make things worse. This might be the case when they 
function as tick-box exercises focused on achieving mere compliance, without the 
possibility to oppose and without real substantial or procedural checks on the process. 
In the worst case, such practices might contribute to a phenomenon we could call 
‘blue-washing’, which similarly to ‘green-washing’, entails that they allow an 
organization to paint a picture of itself as more privacy-friendly than actually is the 
case.35 
 
In an early discussion of PETs, Burkert (1998) already stated that such design-based 
approaches have important external limitations, in both narrowing down the broad 
political concept of privacy from its active participation-oriented elements to a more 
passive anonymity one, and thus also pre-empting public mobilisation. He points to 
the need of opening PET design to public participation. Here we get to a second 
important point: public involvement no longer revolves outside or around, but inside 
these spaces and processes of ICT design. 
 
6. Conclusion: ‘privacy by network’, limits, tensions and lessons in re-
designing privacy 
 
This is an issue that’s much wider than even legal or deeper or more 
fundamental than legal (…) Going even deeper which is our attitudes, our 
philosophical underpinning of how do we see with increased technology, 
increased autonomy on the individual sometimes by nature of technology, 
generally speaking, how do we redress the balance between the individual 
and the system? (Peer Quantified Self, CANDID consultation 2017) 
 
                                                          
35 The color blue here pertains to privacy as one of the first-generation human rights as civic and 
political freedoms often called blue rights. This is in contrast with second-generation economic, social 
and cultural rights (red rights) and third-generation environmental and other rights (green rights). 
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This article has focused on the design of privacy and personal data protection 
safeguards into smart artefacts, smart infrastructures and smart cities. We have 
sketched a short history of different but complementary approaches to realise this, 
such as Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), Privacy by Design (PbD), Data 
Protection by Design (DPbD) and Privacy Engineering (PE). We have observed the 
formation of a techno-epistemic network around designing privacy, over time 
gathering an array of actors from different practices including regulation, technology 
development, software engineering, standardisation, organizational management, risk 
assessment, business entrepreneuring, digital security, consultancy and academia. 
There have been efforts to stabilise the idea through networking around 
methodological frameworks such as guidelines, impact assessment templates, design 
strategies and standardisation. The debate around privacy and data protection in 
design saw these notions circulating throughout the expansive network of these 
practices, being articulated differently at each site, where they operate through 
different concepts, implementing tools and (techno-)epistemological bases.  
We can distinguish three different levels at which networking efforts have become 
manifested: the individual, the organizational, and the infrastructural. In the evolution 
of the techno-epistemic network we have observed how certain actors have gradually 
become aligned, while others become unaligned. First, we have observed a focus on 
protecting the privacy of the individual. This includes the possibility for individuals 
themselves - directly and autonomously - to engage in information processes of 
identity disclosure by means of PETs, but also of other types of self-defence 
technologies. Such a perspective corresponds to an articulation of privacy of which 
the legal counterpart would be the right to informational self-determination (see 
section 4.1). Second, data protection legislation moves privacy-design solutions away 
from the individual level and centers on the organization as the unit for achieving 
effective privacy protection. The regulatory counterpart of this privacy articulation is 
the legal right to personal data protection provided by data controllers (see section 
4.2). The scope of data protection legislation however, does not directly address the 
manufacturers of data processing technologies and software developers. These 
technology producers become involved when we move to the third, infrastructural 
level. Here multiple stakeholders in the ICT chain gather in standardisation exercises 
that are used to expand the design dimension of privacy beyond single devices – thus 
beyond single organisations (see section 4.4). This expansion of design requirements 
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throughout the stakeholder chain transversalises the notion of privacy to reach across, 
and align the different actors and levels of privacy articulation.36  
Here we can introduce the notion of “privacy by network” as a result of our study, 
which can be added to the three other privacy-design orientations mentioned in 
section 2: privacy by architecture, privacy by policy and privacy by interaction. The 
notion of privacy by network, by contrast, does not describe an approach oriented 
towards building privacy friendly ICTs, but rather highlights a certain predicament of 
the networked and distributed efforts to design privacy and data protection. The 
ambition of having privacy and personal data protection designed into complex ICT 
infrastructures that have to be ‘smart’, interoperable and highly interconnected, come 
with the need of strategically aligning many sectors and actors  around specific design 
frameworks. Here, different articulations of privacy according to the specific 
vocabularies and procedures of organizational and engineering practices become 
linked. This occurs through increasing networking and coordination efforts within 
multi-stakeholder and co-regulatory fora37, standardisation platforms for achieving 
sociotechnological interoperability, and public private partnerships on smart 
environments and cities38. In this sense, ‘privacy by network’ is crucially linked to the 
notion of the ‘network society’ in which networked ICT infrastructure is 
fundamentally linked to hybrid organizational (economic, regulatory) forms based on 
social networks (Castells 2010)39.  
 
Privacy here becomes a normative transversal. On the one hand, it has to be built 
along the smart digital infrastructure of the networked society (like the IoT, smart 
grids, smart cities), following the technological roll-out of computing systems that are 
becoming more and more ‘ubiquitous’, ‘pervasive’ and ‘hyperconnected’. On the 
other hand, privacy starts to also permeate and align the efforts of the practices and 
disciplines that have become mobilised to co-produce responsible ICT innovation. In 
such a process privacy becomes itself ‘re-engineered’. In the example of the IoT for 
instance, standardised privacy-design had to cross-cut different technical components 
of the system to make them interact, while allowing the coordination of efforts of 
different ICT manufacturers, data controllers, privacy engineers and organizational 
risk managers (see section 4.4). There is an important role for networkers (often with 
hybrid affiliations) within these socio-technical processes, who position themselves 
                                                          
36 The chain perspective is also relevant for understanding the interdependencies of data processing  
across multiple stakeholders, which can give rise to systemic privacy risks at the level of the broader 
ICT ecosystem.  
37 Like those involved in developing DPIA templates for RFID and smart metering technologies. 
38 See sections 2 and 4.4. 
39 A second source is Actor Network Theory (Callon 1986), (Latour 1999). 
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between leading institutions. They endeavor to set up specific methodological 
frameworks for privacy-design as ‘obligatory passage points’ for these broader 
networks.40 These are presented as solutions to the concerns of multiple public and 
private actors, such as addressing the ‘law lag’ problem and favoring free flow of data 
in making the digital single market (for regulators), building consumer trust (for 
companies), standardising and operationalising the privacy-design conceptions (for 
organizations and engineers), etc. Different knowledge bases thereby become 
mobilised and linked to operationalise the notions of PbD, DPbD and DPIA in the 
process of meeting high infrastructural ambitions. Within this setting, privacy-design 
functions as a cross-cutting and stabilising promise. 
 
Different tensions can be observed here: those between various levels and practices 
within the techno-epistemic network and those that become apparent by extending our 
look to other practices engaged in PbD and DPbD (e.g, by legal and civic actors), 
which are currently situated outside, or at the margins of privacy by network 
activities. 
A first tension pertains to the distributed responsibility within the network. In the 
introduction, we pointed at an increasing delegation of part of the responsibility for 
the (privacy) governance of information technologies from public institutions to 
(public and private) data-controlling organisations. However, this move overlooks 
important aspects. For instance, whereas from the legal viewpoint, the controller is the 
entity that can be held liable, brought to court and made to respond de jure to 
allegations of breaches to the rights of data subjects, responsibility becomes de facto 
distributed and decentralised. Part of the responsibility starts moving towards other 
practices and sites in the network like privacy engineering and standardisation bodies 
with ensuing transfer of the concrete task to protect rights.41 There is therefore a 
lacuna, in the GDPR as well as in the theories and practices intended to follow up on 
the requirements of DPbD, pertaining to where to place responsibility.42  
A second problem pertains to the existence of a gap between law and engineering.  
We have learnt from peers that there are struggles at the operational level to meet the 
high-level policy expectations of privacy-design, since legal principles cannot readily 
                                                          
40 For this notion, see Callon 1986. 
41 Some have argued that this hybrid innovation governance situation requires a shift from individual 
role responsibility to ‘collective co-responsibility’ for the innovation process, partly through such 
‘responsibilisation’ methods like standardization, certification and codes of conduct that go beyond the 
limits of positive law (von Schomberg 2011). 
42 Beyond responsibility (performance of roles) lies accountability, in the sense of the requirement to 
give an account to the public and/or regulators of how a certain role has been carried out and conforms 
to legal and ethical requirements (Raab 2012). The ability of distributed responsibility-holders in the 
privacy-design network to give such accounts would be in some doubt. 
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be translated into engineering requirements. In legal practices, these principles are 
abstract, open-ended and have different possible interpretations, whereas engineering 
practices require unambiguous meanings and formal definitions of design concepts.  
The translation into code seems often to be possible only through mediating concepts 
that address the work of managers of these design processes, e.g., as a range of 
different ‘privacy design strategies’, or in terms of ‘co-creation’ principles based on 
managing customer relations. We have argued that the nature of privacy changes at 
the design table, where it is not articulated as a fundamental right, but according to 
very different vocabularies as a protection goal for design, a formal definition for 
technical specification, or a transversal infrastructural concern. The term stays as a 
main signifier but the attributed meanings vary. Thus, rather than a metamorphosis or 
transformation of rights in design we observe a kind of rupture. 
This point was strengthened as we extended our peer consultations towards jurists. 
Here, we have seen that both judges, human rights and privacy scholars point to 
decisive limits in terms of how far law, in its various aspects, can and should go in 
order to accommodate the needs and requirements of design-based solutions.43 This 
poses the question how jurists could engage with design and engineering in better 
ways. This was one aspect of the notion of ‘right engineering’, pointing to learning 
lessons from legally relevant fields on how to increase guarantees on the quality and 
procedures of privacy articulations within design processes, when we take the notion 
of privacy as a fundamental right more seriously. 
A third type of tension pertains to the space for user engagement and to participation 
of publics to processes of ICT design. We have observed strong standardisation 
efforts where co-creation is organised around consumer trust issues to include 
’transversal values’ for interoperability and standardisation. However, the margins for 
co-creation with users are restrained by arguments about systemic complexity and 
technological functionality that engineers must address and the infrastructure has to 
satisfy. The scaling up to make smart technologies produced by multiple 
organizations interoperable within larger ICT interconnected infrastructures (IoT, 
smart grids) serves the need for making new Europe-wide or global markets. It 
however also leads to network exclusions and to vulnerabilities at the lower scales 
(i.e. at local levels, with data subjects and rights holders, publics, etc). Privacy and 
data protection (by design) in this context seem to correspond with the need for 
external ‘legitimation’ of current technology-driven visions underlying the digital 
economy. This overstretching of scalability in large infrastructural network 
                                                          
43 On crossing this ‘Rubicon’ between law and engineering in privacy design, see Rommetveit, Tanas 
and van Dijk (forthcoming 2018). 
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alignments thus leads to frictions that cast fundamental questions about rights’ 
engineering and privacy by network in a different light, namely one pertaining to the 
(right) scales and (right) sites for the articulation of rights and freedoms and the 
requirements of engineering. 
Lastly, in extending towards publics, important limits need also to be recognised 
about the role and promises of such design-based practices at the intersection of ICT 
innovation governance, new economic opportunities from the digital market and the 
threats of un-checked and unaccountable surveillance. We have seen that design 
exercises often focus on mere compliance, which has nevertheless the potential of 
having pre-emptive effects on public mobilisation (‘public palliatives’), whereas such 
mobilisation has already proven to be an effective alternative avenue for obtaining 
privacy protection. In the worst case, they might even allow organizations to portray 
themselves in a more privacy-friendly light than is factually justified (‘blue washing’). 
These developments, raise questions about the reasons for introducing such design-
based approaches in the first place, namely to address publicly voiced privacy 
concerns and to mitigate data processing powers that large organizations increasingly 
wield over individuals. Privacy is here taken as a political and civic freedom faced 
with the threats posed by the new surveillance economy. This brings us back to where 
this article started: describing the waves of re-engineering the concept of privacy. It 
reminds us of situating these design-based approaches in a broader context of 
unbalanced societal power relationships, in the light of their justification, and in order 
to attain ‘right’ insights in both their strengths and limitations. 
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